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Abstract
This paper assesses the welfare impact of trade and technology diusion as well as the change
in the cross-country distribution of GDP due to removal of trade costs and diusion barriers.
The model extends the multi-country Ricardian trade model of Alvarez and Lucas (2007) to
include technology diusion with diusion barriers. A key feature of the model is that some
countries export goods produced by foreign technology via diusion. The model is calibrated
to match the world GDP distribution, the merchandise trade and technology diusion shares
of GDP, and real GDP per capita for a sample of 31 countries. Data on international trade in
royalties, license fees, and information intensive services are used as proxies for international
technology diusion. There are three key ndings. First, the welfare gains from removing dif-
fusion barriers are 4{60% across countries, generally larger than the gains from removing trade
costs (8{40%). The main reason is that diusion has a larger impact on the nontradable sector
due to the substitutability between trade and diusion in the tradable sector. Another reason is
that diusion barriers are generally larger than trade costs. Second, removing trade costs and
diusion barriers has little impact on reducing the dispersion of real GDP per capita (measured
by Gini index) across countries. Compared to the benchmark, free diusion decreases the Gini
by 4%, and free trade decreases the Gini by 2%. Third, removing diusion barriers increases
trade, which indicates that diusion may enhance trade.
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1 Introduction
International technology diusion has become increasingly important over the past twenty years.
While precise measures of international technology diusion are lacking, the available data reveal
rapid growth. For example, the value of international trade in royalties and license fees has increased
by a factor of eleven over the last two decades.1 In some developed countries, trade in royalties and
license fees has been reported as the second most important category among the aggregate service
categories (Breinlich and Criscuolo, 2011).2 Combined with trade in information intensive services,
the world total value of payments associated with international technology diusion now equals 14%
of world merchandise trade.3 Moreover, the magnitude of technology diusion as percentage of gross
domestic product (GDP) is signicant: payments associated with inward technology diusion are
as large as 16.3% of GDP in Ireland and average 4% of GDP across developed and emerging market
economies.4
Technology diusion is important, because it not only changes the productivity of goods pro-
duced for domestic markets, but it also opens up the exporting scope for the beneting countries.
An example of this is a DVD player, which is typically licensed to a Chinese manufacturer and
then exported abroad. In 2002, Chinese rms typically paid $15-$20 per player in license fees and
in turn were responsible for 70% of the world DVD player output.5 Not surprisingly, China was
the top exporter of DVD players. Beneting from international technology diusion, China became
the biggest exporter of Information, Communication, Technology (ICT) goods in 2004.6 Clearly,
without technology diusion, signicantly dierent trade patterns would have occurred.
Motivated by its increasing importance, I investigate international technology diusion in the
presence of international trade in this paper to allow for the potential impact of diusion on trade.
The purpose of this paper is to assess and compare the welfare impact of international trade and
technology diusion. This paper also aims to quantify the change in the cross-country distribution
of GDP due to reduction in trade costs for goods and removal of barriers to technology diusion.
1Data source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2008).
2The United Kingdom (UK), the world's second largest services exporter, reported that the value of exports and
imports of royalties and license fees is approximately 23% and 26%, respectively, of total trade in services between
2000 and 2005 in the UK (Breinlich and Criscuolo, 2011).
3Data source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2008).
4The payments associated with inward technology diusion in this paper refer to those through imports of royalties,
license fees, and information intensive services. The sample contains 31 countries. See Data Description and Figure
2 in Section 4 for more details.
5Producers of DVD players need to pay license fees to the patent holders of the DVD technology (Sony, Philips,
Toshiba and Time Warner) as well as for MPEG-2 licences.
6Data source: OECD, ITS database.
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To accomplish this, two questions are posed. First, how large are diusion barriers and trade
costs across countries? Second, given the current level of trade costs and diusion barriers, how
important is their elimination in terms of the change in welfare and the cross-country distribution
of GDP?
To answer these questions, this paper develops and calibrates a general equilibrium model in
which countries interact through trade in goods and diusion of technology. The model extends the
multi-country Ricardian trade model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2007)
to include diusion of knowledge.7 In the classic Ricardian trade literature, technology is implicitly
assumed to be exclusive to each country; thus, there is no room for technology diusion in the
status quo. To model technology diusion, I dierentiate between two types of technologies in
each country: exclusive technologies, which are available only to the home country, and diusive
technologies, which are available in all countries due to technology diusion.
To investigate the magnitude of diusion, I introduce barriers to technology diusion because
barriers play a key role in determining volumes of diusion. Similar to merchandise trade, technol-
ogy diusion in the model is limited by \iceberg" diusion barriers. This assumption is consistent
with the empirical evidence on the existence of signicant barriers to international knowledge diu-
sion. For example, Peri (2005) examines the role of dierent borders, languages, and technological
dierences, and Li (2009) investigates the changing pattern of border and distance eects in knowl-
edge ows.
The model has two sectors: a tradable sector, which produces intermediate goods, and a non-
tradable sector, which produces nal consumption goods. The key departure from Alvarez and
Lucas (2007) is that both sectors are open to technology diusion. Diusion enlarges the set of
available technology for each country and potentially increases productivity. With diusion, pro-
ductivity is determined by the domestic technology in the production country plus the diusive
technology from abroad. Between each country pair, there exist trade costs and diusion barriers.
Representative agents in each country shop around the world to nd the least costly method of
obtaining tradable and nontradable goods. An equilibrium outcome is that some countries (inter-
mediaries) export goods produced by foreign technology via diusion. For example, an intermediary
country imight use diusive technology from country j in production to achieve higher productivity
7\Diusion of knowledge" and \technology diusion" are interchangeably used in this paper. Knowledge is any
intellectual input which serves to produce goods. A blueprint, an industrial design, a process redesign, and technical
support are all examples of knowledge. Eaton and Kortum (2005) use the word \ideas" as \the fundamental atom of
technology". In this paper, I use \knowledge" or \technology".
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and then export to country n. This process entails diusion barriers from country j to i and trade
costs from country i to n. Allowing for countries to interact through both merchandise trade and
technology diusion enriches the international merchandise trade pattern in the model and enables
the model to generate both merchandise trade and technology diusion volume consistent with the
data.8
To quantitatively assess the current level of diusion barriers and trade costs as well as their
welfare impact, I calibrate the model to match the merchandise trade share, the technology diusion
share, the size of GDP, and the real GDP per capita for a sample of 31 countries.9 Data on
international trade in royalties, license fees, and information intensive services are used as proxies
for international technology diusion. The calibrated model has explanatory power of at least 95%
for all variables of interest.10
There are three key ndings. First, the welfare impact of technology diusion is generally larger
than that of merchandise trade. Removing diusion barriers in the benchmark increases welfare by
4{60% across countries, while removing merchandise trade costs increases welfare by 8{40%. The
main reason is that technology diusion has a larger impact on the nontradable sector due to the
substitutability between merchandise trade and technology diusion in the tradable sector. That
is, obtaining foreign technology to produce goods locally decreases the incentive to import goods.
Because technology diusion substitutes for merchandise trade, diusion of technology benets a
nontradable sector more so than it does a tradable sector. Another reason is that the technology
diusion barriers are larger than merchandise trade costs for most countries. I also perform another
counterfactual exercise to compare the dierence in welfare between the benchmark model and a
hypothetical autarkic world. This experiment informs us of the current level of welfare gains from
diusion and trade. I nd that abolishing trade leads to larger welfare losses than does abolishing
diusion. This implies that the welfare improvement of moving from prohibitive trade costs to the
benchmark is larger than that of moving from prohibitive diusion barriers to the benchmark. This
in turn suggests that, currently, the world has exploited more of the potential gains from reductions
in the barriers to merchandise trade than the potential gains from reductions in the barriers to
technology diusion. This calls for more attention to be paid to the reduction of diusion barriers.
8In a model without technology diusion, the correlation coecient between the model generated merchandise
trade and the data is 0.59, as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007). My model generates the correlation as high as 0.92 for
merchandise trade share (as a percentage of a country's GDP).
9The sample includes most OECD countries and main emerging economies. The selection criteria is explained in
Section 4.1.
10A measure of the explanatory power of the model is given by R2H = 1 
PI
i=1( eHdatai   eHmodeli )2PI
i=1( eHdatai )2 .
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Second, I nd that free merchandise trade and free technology diusion increase real GDP per
capita by 5{30% and 4{55%, respectively. In both cases, the dispersion of real GDP per capita
across countries is reduced. The Gini index of real GDP per capita is decreased by 4% due to moving
from the benchmark to free technology diusion and by 2% due to moving from the benchmark to
free merchandise trade. This is consistent with the result that free technology diusion generates
larger gains than does free merchandise trade.
Third, removing diusion barriers increases merchandise trade because countries achieve higher
productivity from obtaining foreign technology via diusion and therefore improve their ability to
export to the global market. This nding implies that diusion may enhance trade and thus is
dierent from the literature because most existing trade models predict that diusion is a substitute
for trade: if one can use the technology of one's trading partners, then there is less need for trade
(Chaney, 2008). However, in this paper, due to the existence of intermediary countries who benet
from lower diusion barriers and greater diusion volumes, removal of diusion barriers eventually
increases trade. This result is also consistent with the rst two ndings because removing diusion
barriers has \spillover" eects on merchandise trade. In summary, free technology diusion has
greater welfare impact and contributes more to reducing the dispersion of real GDP per capita
than does free merchandise trade.
These ndings contribute to the emerging literature simultaneously examining trade and tech-
nology diusion (e.g., Eaton and Kortum, 2006; Rodrguez-Clare, 2007; Chaney, 2008).11 This
literature models technology diusion as a global pool without diusion barriers or trade costs for
diusion and do not use data associated with technology diusion to quantify the gains. However,
as pointed out by Keller (2004), there is no indication of the existence of a global pool of technology,
and knowledge can only be partially codied in diusion. Thus, I introduce barriers to technology
diusion and quantitatively assessed their importance. Additionally, technology diusion involves
both market transactions and externalities and is dicult to measure in the data (Keller, 2004).
Therefore, quantifying the gains from diusion represents a signicant challenge (Ramondo and
Rodrguez-Clare, 2010). In calibrating the model, I use market transaction data (captured by
trade in royalties, license fees and information intensive services) to measure technology diusion,
which yields a lower bound of real gains from technology diusion. My results can be compared
with the literature on gains from global diusion without diusion barriers. This literature usually
pursues an indirect approach based on an application of the semi-endogenous growth model to
11Grossman and Helpman (1991) is an early exception.
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quantify the importance of diusion. For example, Rodrguez-Clare (2007) based his work on the
growth rate of a country and calculated the upper bound of the overall gains from both trade and
diusion to be between 206% and 240% for a country with approximately 1% of the world's GDP.
My results for overall gains from trade and diusion for a similar country are around 69{73%. It is
not surprising that the gains from diusion in this paper are smaller than those in Rodrguez-Clare
(2007) because I model diusion dierently and use market transaction data to directly quantify
the gains from diusion. This helps to understand and dissect the gains from technology diusion
through dierent channels.
The model structure in the present paper comes close to another branch of relevant literature
which quanties the importance of multinational production (MP). The state-of-the-art works on
MP include Ramondo and Rodrguez-Clare (2009, 2010), Irarrazabal et al. (2009), and Arkolakis
et al. (2011). Ramondo and Rodrguez-Clare (2009) incorporate MP into the model of trade by
allowing a country's technologies to be used for production abroad through multinational aliates
and explore the relation between MP and trade. Irarrazabal et al. (2009) introduce intra-rm
trade into Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) to explore the correlation between trade and MP
ows. Intra-rm trade is important in MP since multinational aliates often import goods from
their home countries. In this paper, however, I use trade in royalties and license fees to proxy
for technology diusion. While part of trade in royalties and license fees is probably attributed
to intra-rm transactions, a large part of it presumably is not. Therefore, the present framework
captures the diusion of foreign technologies to non-aliated indigenous rms, which MP does not
capture. For example, if U.S. technologies are used for production in Canada by non-aliated
Canadian rms, this way of sharing technologies across countries cannot be captured by MP but is
partly captured by trade in royalties and license fees.12 In fact, trade in royalties and license fees
covers the exchange of payments and receipts associated with technology transfer between residents
and nonresidents, whether or not it belongs to intra-rm trade. Hence, my approach provides a
dierent proxy for technology diusion. Whether intra-rm trade or trade in royalties and license
fees represents a better proxy for technology diusion is not clear, but the two approaches are
complementary to each other. As Ramondo and Rodrguez-Clare (2010) point out, much more
attention should be devoted to understanding where the gains of diusion come from and which
are the main barriers to diusion. This paper therefore provides a new approach on quantifying
the gains from diusion.
12Here, the word \partly" emphasizes that only the part associated with market transactions can be captured by
the data.
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This paper is also related to the empirical literature examining the role of borders, physical
distance, languages, technological dierences, and other factors determining knowledge ows (e.g.,
Peri, 2005; Li, 2009). These empirical studies use patent citation data as a proxy for knowledge
ows and mainly capture the barriers to externalities in technology diusion through knowledge
spillovers. This paper uses a general equilibrium model to quantitatively assess the barriers to
technology diusion based on detailed data on market transactions of technology (e.g., royalties
and license fees). This allows us to use a fully-specied model to make predictions on all variables
of interest and to investigate the interactions between merchandise trade and technology diusion.
Finally, this paper provides new insights into the recent literature exploring the potential gains
from liberalizing merchandise trade in Ricardian models (Alvarez and Lucas, 2007; Waugh, 2010).
The welfare gains of moving from total isolation to free trade and free diusion are more than double
the gains of moving from total isolation to free trade alone. On the other hand, I obtain very similar
magnitude of gains of moving from total isolation to free trade alone to that obtained by Alvarez
and Lucas (2007). For example, they calculated the upper bounds of gains of moving from autarky
to free trade in terms of consumption equivalence for the U.S., Japan, and Denmark to be 10%,
14%, and 38% respectively. My results for the gains of moving from autarky to free merchandise
trade for these three countries are 10%, 15%, and 36% respectively. When both diusion and trade
are allowed for, the overall gains are larger: 15% for the U.S., 25% for Japan, and 77% for Denmark.
Here small countries benet more than large countries from both merchandise trade and technology
diusion because of the market size eect: large countries (in terms of GDP size) already enjoy big
domestic markets, which limits the potential gains from free trade and diusion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of trade and
technology diusion with one tradable sector to illustrate the mechanism and intuition. Section
3 develops the full model with both tradable and nontradable sectors and analyzes the general
equilibrium. Section 4 describes the data and calibration procedure as well as the benchmark results.
Section 5 presents the quantitative results from counterfactual exercises. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Model of Trade and Technology Diusion
This section presents a model with tradable goods to illustrate the mechanism and intuition. The
full model with both tradable and nontradable goods is presented in Section 3.
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2.1 Environment
There are I countries indexed by i 2 f1; :::; Ig endowed with Li units of labor (the only factor
of production). Each country produces a continuum of tradable goods indexed by u 2 [0; 1]. A
representative agent consumes a continuum of goods u in quantities q(u) to maximize a CES utility
U =
Z 1
0
q(u)
 1
 du
 
 1
(2.1)
with elasticity of substitution  > 0.
Let ci denote the unit cost of input in country i. In this section, the unit cost of input ci is simply
equal to the wage rate wi since labor is the only factor of production.
13 As in Eaton and Kortum
(2002), country i's eciency in producing good u is denoted as zi(u). With constant returns to
scale, the unit cost of producing good u in country i is then ci=zi(u). Following Alvarez and Lucas
(2007), I work with the inverse of productivity, the cost parameter xi(u) where xi(u)
  = zi(u).
xi(u) is the cost parameter associated with country i's technology to produce good u. The unit
cost of producing good u in country i is then xi(u)
ci, where  > 0 is a common parameter across
goods and countries that amplies the eect of variability of cost parameter.14
The model without technology diusion follows Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and
Lucas (2007). The cost parameters xi for each good u are assumed to be random variables, which
are drawn from a distribution that depends upon the total stock of knowledge in country i. This
corresponds to the economy's productivity for a good u which is determined by the best knowledge
available for the production of this good.15 It is easy to show that xi is distributed exponentially
with parameter i, xi  exp(i), where i is the stock of knowledge located in country i and i is
also called technology state parameter.16 As in Alvarez and Lucas (2007), country i's productivity
is only determined by its own knowledge stock i; that is, technology is exclusive to its home
13I use the notation ci here to facilitate the comparison with the full model in Section 3.
14The two approaches in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) are equivalent except for the
denition of . The  in this paper, as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007), is the inverse of Eaton and Kortum's . Hence,
in this paper the higher , the larger dispersion of the productivity distribution.
15As in Eaton and Kortum (2005), the fundamental atom of technology is an idea (\a piece of knowledge") which
is just a recipe to produce good u with some eciency z. Knowledge for producing a particular good dier only in
terms of a \quality" parameter.
16This result comes from having  stock of knowledge for each good (each associated with a cost parameter), all of
which are independently drawn from an exponential distribution with parameter 1. Then, the distribution of the best
knowledge is exponential with parameter . The mathematical derivation is as below. Let q represent the quality of
knowledge, then Pr(Q  q) = H(q) = 1 1=q. Let v be the quality of the best knowledge that has arrived up to time
t, then using ex P1k=0 xk=k! we get Pr(V  v) =P1k=0(e ()k=k!)H(v)k = e =v, and hence, x  1=v  exp().
See Kortum (1997) and Rodrguez-Clare (2007).
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country.
In order to incorporate technology diusion, I dierentiate between two types of technologies
in each country: exclusive technologies, which are available only to its home country, and diusive
technologies, which are available to all countries due to technology diusion. Let xEi and x
D
i denote
the cost parameters associated with exclusive and diusive technologies. Assume xEi and x
D
i are
independently drawn from exponential distribution with parameters Ei and 
D
i , respectively. This
is equivalent to dividing each country's domestic stock of knowledge i into two components:
exclusive knowledge Ei and diusive knowledge 
D
i , where i = 
E
i +
D
i . In other words, exclusive
knowledge is limited to domestic production in its home country, while diusive knowledge is
migrating across national borders. Without technology diusion, each country's productivity is
only determined by its domestic knowledge stock. Hence, the lowest cost of production in country i
is minf(xEi )ci; (xDi )cig where xi = minfxEi ; xDi g and xi  exp(i) by the property of exponential
distribution.17 With technology diusion, the scale of the set of available knowledge for each
country is enlarged. Country i can therefore obtain the lowest costs of production from both its
own technology, which is associated with its own knowledge stock i, and the diusive technology
from other countries Dj (j 6= i) because only diusive technology can be used in foreign countries.
This means that country i can obtain the cost parameter xDj associated with 
D
j (j 6= i) via
technology diusion.
Next I introduce barriers to technology diusion because barriers play a key role in determining
trade volumes. Consider a tradable good u produced in country m. This good can be produced
with the productivity determined by country m's own technology at unit cost xm(u)
cm. Good
u can also be produced in country m with the productivity determined by foreign technology
from country i (m 6= i) through technology diusion. But this process entails some barriers,
denoted by bmi. Diusion barriers bmi are country-pair specic costs associated with using diusive
technology from technology home country i to produce in country m. Similar to trade costs for
goods, diusion barriers are also modeled as \iceberg" costs: bmi < 1 (if m 6= i), bmi = 1 (if m = i),
and bmi  bmjbji. Diusion barriers only occur when diusive technology is used by a country
outside its home country. If the diusive technology is used in its home country, no extra costs
occur by assumption (i.e., bii = 1). Diusion barriers can also be viewed as a discount factor which
belongs to the interval [0; 1], where b closer to 1 means lower barriers to diusion and b closer to
0 means higher barriers. Taking into account technology diusion with diusion barriers, good u
17The property is that if x and y are independent, x  exp() and y  exp(), then minfx; yg  exp(+ ).
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can also be produced in country m at unit cost (xDi (u)
cm)=bmi. It uses the domestic input cm
in country m, but the cost parameter is associated with country i's diusive technology, which
has to be discounted by diusion barriers between country i and m. I dene cmi = cm=bmi for
convenience. Hence the lowest cost to produce good u in country m is simply
minfxm(u)cm;min
i6=m
xDi (u)
cmig = min
8<:xEm(u) cm;mini
"
xDi (u)
b
1=
mi
#
cm
9=; (2.2)
2.2 Equilibrium
Following Alvarez and Lucas (2007), I relabel goods by the vector x  (xE ; xD) rather than u
where xE  (xE1 ; xE2 ; :::; xEI ) and xD  (xD1 ; xD2 ; :::; xDI ). Under perfect competition, the unit cost
of a tradable good (xE ; xD) produced in country m (intermediary country) with technology from
country i and then shipped to country n is (xDi )
cmi=knm, where knm is "iceberg" trade cost for
goods, with one unit of a good shipped from m resulting in knm  1 units arriving in n (where
knn = 1, and kni  knmkmi for all n;m; i). The price of the good (xE ; xD) in country n is simply
the minimum cost at which it can be obtained by n, namely
pn(x
E ; xD) = min
8<:mini
"
xEi
k
1=
ni
#
ci;min
i;m
"
xDi
b
1=
mi k
1=
nm
#
cm
9=; (2.3)
The rst term on the right-hand side (RHS) minimizes over all possible ways in which country n
can procure the good conditional on using exclusive technology. Note that country n can benet
from the exclusive technology of other countries through importing the good produced by exclusive
technology of other countries (i.e., i 6= n). The second term on the RHS minimizes over all possible
ways in which country n can procure the good conditional on using diusive technology from
technology home country i to produce in an intermediary country m for all fi;mg combinations.
Note that country n can also benet from the diusive technology of other countries through either
using diusive technology from other countries to produce the good domestically (i.e., i 6= m = n) or
importing the good produced by diusive technology of other countries in an intermediary country
(i.e., m 6= n for all possible fi;mg). The rst term is a standard term as in Eaton and Kortum
(2002) and in Alvarez and Lucas (2007). The second term now emerges due to technology diusion.
From the properties of the exponential distribution, it follows that pn(x
E ; xD)1= is distributed
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exponentially with parameter 18
n 
X
i
(Eni + 
D
ni); (2.4)
where Eni = (ci=kni)
 1=Ei and 
D
ni = (~cni)
 1=Di , and ~cni  minmfcmi=knmg is the minimum cost
of the input for goods produced in country m using diusive technology from i (taking into account
all possible intermediary country m). Intuitively speaking, the price parameter n summaries the
eective technology that country n can tap into from all over the world, after taking into account
the knowledge stocks around the world, the input costs around the world, trade costs, and diusion
barriers between n and other countries.
Given the distribution of prices across goods and CES preferences, the price index in country
n, pn is given by
p1 n =
Z
pn(x
E ; xD)1 dF (xE ; xD)
where F (xE ; xD) is the joint distribution of xE and xD. Then, the price index in n is
pn = C
 
n ; (2.5)
where C =  (1 + (1   ))1=(1 ) is a constant, with  () being the Gamma function.19 As the
eective technology available to n increases, consumers are better o.
As shown by Eaton and Kortum (2002), the average price charged by any country i in country
n is the same. Moreover, by the properties of the exponential distribution, a share Eni  Eni=n
of goods bought by country n will be produced by country i with its exclusive technology. Letting
Xn = wnLn denote total spending by country n, then
EniXn (2.6)
is the value of goods produced with exclusive technology in country i that are exported to country
n. Similarly, DniXn =
Dni
n
Xn is the value of goods consumed by n that are produced with diusive
technology from i. Note that those goods could be produced in any intermediary country m 2
argminj(~cji=knj). Let y
D
nmi be the share of the spending on goods produced in country m (then
shipped to n) in total spending by country n on goods produced with diusive technology from
country i. We have
P
m y
D
nmi = 1 since these are shares over all possible intermediary countries for
18These properties are: (1) if x  exp() and k > 0 then kx  exp(=k); and (2) if x and y are independent,
x  exp() and y  exp(), then minfx; yg  exp(+ ).
19Rodrguez-Clare (2007) explains why 1 + (1  ) > 0 holds.
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the pair fn; ig. In equilibrium, the following "complementary slackness" conditions must hold:
cmi=knm > ~cni ) yDnmi = 0
yDnmi > 0) cmi=knm = ~cni
The value of goods produced in m using diusive technology from i for n is DnmiXn, where 
D
nmi 
yDnmi
D
ni=n. Summing over i yields the total imports by n from m of goods produced with diusive
technology, X
i
DnmiXn (2.7)
Using (2.6) and (2.7), imports of goods by n from i are
0@Eni +X
j
Dnij
1AXn = (Eni + Dnii)Xn +
0@X
j 6=i
Dnij
1AXn (2.8)
Thus, total imports of goods by n from i 6= n are
Mni =
0@Eni +X
j
Dnij
1AwnLn (2.9)
Aggregate imports for country n are simply Mn =
P
i6=nMni. Trade balance conditions are
X
i 6=n
Mni =
X
i6=n
Min (2.10)
The expression for total value associated with technology diusion from country i to production
country m is denoted by MDmi. This is associated with the value of goods produced by diusive
technology from country i to m and those goods are then shipped to all over the world. Summing
up over all destination countries n yields
MDmi =
X
n
DnmiXn (2.11)
A competitive equilibrium is characterized by vectors of prices pn = (p1; p2; :::; pI) and wages
w = (w1; w2; :::; wI) such that, together with the vector (1; 2; :::; I), equations (2.4) and (2.5)
are satised, the trade balance conditions (2.10) are satised, where a share Eni of goods bought by
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country n is produced by country i's exclusive technology, and a share Dni of goods bought by country
n is produced by country i's diusive technology. The technology diusion condition is expressed by
(2.11).20
2.3 Some results under symmetry
To gain intuition on the mechanism of the model, consider the simple case of symmetric countries
(Li = L) and symmetric trade costs and diusion barriers (kni = k and bni = b for all n 6= i), which
can be solved analytically.
Symmetry yields wn = w,cn = c, w = c, and pn = p. The unit cost of input using diusive
technology is cmi = c=b for all m 6= i. If the condition k < b(< 1) is satised (i.e., diusion barriers
are smaller than trade costs since b is closer to 1 than k), then yDnmi = 0 for all n 6= m: there
is no trade in goods produced with diusive technology since barriers to technology diusion are
smaller than trade costs for goods, and so country n would prefer domestic production using foreign
technology through diusion rather than importing goods from intermediary countries. Hence, if
k < b, there are no intermediary countries in this symmetric world.21 From (2.5), the price level in
any country is
p = C[+ (I   1)(k1=E + b1=D)] w (2.12)
Intuitively, the term inside the squared brackets captures the eective knowledge, which can be en-
joyed by consumers in any country: domestic stock of knowledge  = E+D, exclusive knowledge
from other countries taking into account trade costs for goods, k1=, and diusive knowledge from
other countries taking into account diusion barriers, b1=. Consumers enjoy exclusive knowledge
through importing tradable goods, and diusive knowledge through technology diusion to produce
goods domestically.
Trade Flows The share that country n will devote to spending on goods produced in country
i 6= n with country i's exclusive technology is simply the contribution of country i's exclusive
knowledge to the eective knowledge in country n. Thus, under symmetry it is
E =
k1=E
+ (I   1)(k1=E + b1=D) (2.13)
20We use the normalization:
PI
i=1 wiLi = 1.
21If diusion barriers are larger than trade costs (i.e., b < k), there are no diusion in this symmetric world, since
wages are equalized. But in an asymmetric world, even if b < k, technology diusion exists because countries try to
benet from lower wages in production countries.
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Similarly, the share that n will spend on goods produced locally with diusive technology via
diusion from country i is the contribution of i's diusive knowledge to the eective knowledge in
country n,
D =
b1=D
+ (I   1)(k1=E + b1=D) (2.14)
Now consider the eect of a change in diusion barriers, captured by diusion barrier param-
eter b, on trade ows. When b decreases (i.e., barriers to technology diusion become larger), E
increases, which implies that merchandise import share of country n from country i increases with
bilateral diusion barriers. In this case, if there is no exclusive knowledge (i.e., all knowledge is
diusive, D = ), then E = 0. This is consistent with the prediction about the substitutabil-
ity between merchandise trade and technology diusion in traditional Ricardian models; that is,
technology diusion substitutes for merchandise imports in the tradable sector.
Welfare Gains For simplicity, assume k < b (i.e., merchandise trade costs larger than diusion
barriers) in the benchmark. The gains from moving from isolation to openness based on the
benchmark (the benchmark with trade in goods and technology diusion), call it GO, can be
computed by comparing the changes in real wage, w=p. Under symmetry, wages are equalized
across countries, hence they can be normalized to one. Then one only needs to compare prices
across dierent scenarios to compare the welfare gains. The price index for the benchmark is given
by (2.12), whereas the analogous result with isolation (no merchandise trade and no technology
diusion) is obtained by letting k ! 0 and b ! 0 in (2.12). This yields the price level under
isolation
pISO = C
 w
Hence, the proportional gains from openness (fGO) are given by
fGO = pISO
p
=
"
+ (I   1)(k1=E + b1=D)

#
(2.15)
or, GO = ln(fGO). (Expressions for gains with a tilde represent proportional gains.) It is easy to
see that the gains from openness GO increases with k and b: the lower trade costs or the lower
diusion barriers, the larger the welfare gains from openness.
To compare the gains from trade and the gains from diusion, I calculate gains from trade
by computing the gains of moving from isolation to only trade (no diusion), GT . Analogously, I
calculate gains from diusion by computing the gains of moving from isolation to only diusion (no
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trade), GD. Then I derive the price index when there is only trade. From (2.12), by letting b! 0,
and allowing diusive technology to be used for domestic production and trade, the price for only
trade is
pT = C
h
(1 + (I   1)k1=)
i 
w
Gains from trade are then given by
fGT = pISO
pT
=
h
1 + (I   1)k1=
i
(2.16)
Hence, gains from trade (GT ) increase with the value of k, i.e., the smaller trade costs, the larger
gains from trade. Similarly, the gains from diusion (increase in real wage from isolation to only
diusion and no trade) are
gGD = pISO
pD
=
"
+ (I   1)b1=D

#
(2.17)
The gains from technology diusion (GD) increase with b and the proportion of diusive knowledge
in total knowledge stock (D=). This means that the smaller diusion barriers and the larger share
of diusive knowledge, the larger gains from diusion. Here gains from merchandise trade (GT ) do
not depend on exclusive knowledge (E), because it is implicitly assumed that without diusion, all
goods produced by domestic knowledge can be traded, while only diusive knowledge is amenable
to production in foreign countries through diusion when countries are open to technology diusion.
Then the total gains from current openness are less than the sum of gains from both trade and
diusion (GO < GT +GD), i.e., trade and diusion behave like substitutes in this symmetric world,
but the substitution eect is dampened by the diusion barriers.22
It is worth noting that it is not always the case that gains from diusion are greater than those
from trade. Based on equation (2.16) and (2.17), if b1=(D=) > k1=, gains from diusion are
larger than those from trade. But if the share of diusive knowledge (D=) is small, it could be
that gains from trade are larger (GD < GT ). There is a threshold level of diusive knowledge
D in this symmetric case such that the gains from diusion equal gains from trade. Even if all
knowledge is diusive (i.e., D= = 1, each country has no exclusive knowledge), trade still exists
due to the existence of diusion barriers. Hence, the comparison of welfare gains from trade and
diusion depends on the trade-o between trade costs and diusion barriers as well as the share of
diusive knowledge in overall knowledge stock.
22Denote 4 = GT +GD GO. It is easy to show that 4 decreases as b decreases to 0 (i.e., larger diusion barriers).
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3 Full Model: Tradable and Nontradable Sectors
This section extends the model by allowing for nontradable goods, which are also amenable to
technology diusion, and an input-output loop where intermediate goods are used for the production
of other intermediate goods as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007). I rst present a single, closed economy
before turning to the open economy case.
3.1 Closed Economy Equilibrium
Labor is the only primary (non-produced) factor of production, and production requires labor and
produced, intermediate goods as inputs. There are two sectors in the economy, tradable sector
(intermediate goods) and nontradable sector (nal goods). Formally, I assume that nontradable
goods are continuum goods indexed by v 2 [0; 1] and tradable goods are indexed by u 2 [0; 1]. A
representative agent consumes a continuum of nal consumption goods in quantities qf (v), deriving
utility
U =
Z 1
0
qf (v)
" 1
" dv
 "
" 1
with " > 0.
A continuum of intermediate goods are used to produce a composite intermediate good Q via a
CES production function with  > 0,23
Q =
Z 1
0
q(u)1 1=du
=( 1)
Each intermediate tradable good is produced by a Cobb-Douglas production function using
composite aggregate intermediate good and labor. Let s(u) be the labor used to produce a given
tradable q(u) and let Qm(u) be the level of the composite aggregate. The production technology
for individual intermediate good q(u) is assumed to be
q(u) = x(u) s(u)Qm(u)1 : (3.1)
where  is the labor share. Total factor productivity (TFP) levels are reected by x(u)  and vary
across goods u. As in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2007), the individual x(u)
23It is also called a Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz (SDS) aggregate.
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(\costs" variable, i.e., the inverses of TFP) are random variables, independent across goods, with
a common density g. Note that a low x-value means a high productivity level. Since intermediate
goods dier only in their costs x(u), and all goods q(u) enter symmetrically in the aggregate, thus,
as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007), I relabel intermediate good u by its cost draw, x > 0, and rewrite
the aggregate Q in the form
Q =
Z 1
0
q(x)1 1=g(x)dx
=( 1)
(3.2)
where q(x) is production of individual tradable good x. Assume that the density g is exponential
with parameter  where  is the stock of knowledge or technology state parameter: x  exp().24
For each individual good u, there are two types of technologies (exclusive and diusive technology)
which can be used to produce u. The buyers pick the lowest cost from these two independent
productivity draws. Therefore, as mentioned in section 2, x = minfxE ; xDg, where xE and xD are
assumed to be independent. Also assume that xE  exp(E) and xD  exp(D). Then  = E+D
by the properties of exponential distribution.25 Hence, in a closed economy, dierentiating between
two types of technology does not change the equilibrium, and the only dierence is that the current
state of technology  has two components: E and D. When diusive knowledge does not exist
(i.e.,  = E), the model is going back to Alvarez and Lucas (2007).26 However, this distinction
will change the open economy equilibrium in section 3.2.
Rewriting equation (3.2) with density function of exponential distribution yields
Q =


Z 1
0
e xq(x)1 1=dx
=( 1)
(3.3)
where  is the parameter of the exponential distribution from which the productivity draw is
realized. Then restate the production function of the individual tradable good as
q(x) = x s(x)Qm(x)1 : (3.4)
Similar to tradable goods, nontradable goods are produced by a Cobb-Douglas function of Qf
composite intermediate good and the labor input sf with labor share . Nontradable goods are
assumed to have the same productivity distribution with tradable goods. The cost parameter
24Pr[X  x] = 1  e x. The random variables x  then have a Frechet distribution.
25The stock of knowledge is the sum of exclusive knowledge and diusive knowledge. Also see footnote 14.
26In Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and Eaton and Kortum (2002), all technology is implicitly assumed to be exclusive
to its home country which is a special case in the present model, i.e., D = 0,  = E
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associated with nontradable goods is denoted by ~x(v) where ~x  exp(). The production function
of the nal goods is
qf (~x) = ~x
 sf (~x)Qf (~x)1 : (3.5)
In per capita terms, the resource constraints imply that

Z 1
0
e ~xsf (~x)d~x+ 
Z 1
0
e xs(x)dx = 1; (3.6)
Qm +Qf = Q; (3.7)
where
Qm = 
Z 1
0
e xQm(x)dx; Qf = 
Z 1
0
e ~xQf (~x)d~x: (3.8)
Let the unit price of individual tradables be p(x). Denote the unit price of aggregate composite
tradable goods by pm. Finally, let the unit price of nontradable goods be pf (~x). In the equilibrium,
p(x) = xBwp1 m (3.9)
where B =  (1  ) 1. The unit cost of input bundle for tradable good is cT = Bwp1 m and
the unit price of tradable good is xcT . The unit price p of the nontradable good is
pf (~x) = ~x
Awp1 m (3.10)
where A =  (1   ) 1 and the unit cost of the input bundle for nontradable good is cNT =
Awp1 m . The unit price of nontradable good is ~xcNT .27 The unit price of aggregate intermediate
is
pm = (CB)
1= =w: (3.11)
where C is a constant.
In this closed Ricardian model, I rst solve for the equilibrium prices pf , pm, and p(x) in terms
of the wage w. Using these prices, I calculate equilibrium quantities. Figure 1 illustrates the cost
27This is because of the same productivity draw for nontradable goods production and for tradable goods. Hence,
technology diusion will have direct impact on the price of consumption goods. This will amplify the eect of
technology diusion in nontradable sector. Rodrguez-Clare (2007) and Ramondo and Rodrguez-Clare (2008) have
the similar set-up to address global technology diusion and multinational production problem. If I assume that
there is no random shock of productivity for production of nontradable goods as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and all
productivity shocks occur in tradable sector, it turns out to give very low welfare impact of technology diusion.
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structure in closed economy. The detailed derivation of closed economy equilibrium is contained in
Appendix A.
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Figure 1: The cost structure in closed economy
3.2 General Equilibrium
Consider an equilibrium in a world of I countries, all with the structure described in section 3.1,
in which merchandise trade is balanced. Note that dierentiating between exclusive and diusive
technology does not change the equilibrium in closed economy, but does impact the equilibrium in
open economy case.
A new notation for the commodity space is needed. Assume that these cost draws are inde-
pendent across countries and across two types of technologies: xEi  exp(Ei ) and xDi  exp(Di )
for country i. Let xE and xD be two vectors: xE = (xE1 ; x
E
2 ; :::; x
E
I ), x
D = (xD1 ; x
D
2 ; :::; x
D
I ). Use
qn(x
E ; xD) for the consumption of tradable good (xE ; xD) in country n, and Qn for consumption
of the aggregates in country n. Let pn(x
E ; xD) be the prices paid for tradable good (xE ; xD) by
producers in country n. Let pmn be the price in country n for a unit of the aggregate.
Analogous to Section 2, for tradable goods, all producers in country n buy at the same, lowest
price:
pn(x
E ; xD) = minfmin
i
(xEi )
cTi =kni;min
i;m
(xDi )
cTmi=knmg
= min

min
i
(xEi )
 c
T
i
kni
;min
i;m
(xDi )
 c
T
m
bmiknm
 (3.12)
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where cTi = Bw

i p
1 
mi , i = 1; :::; I. The rst term on the RHS minimizes over all possible ways in
which country n can procure the tradable goods conditional on using exclusive technology, which
precludes diusive technology and implies importing goods from the country where the exclusive
technology originates. The second term on the RHS minimizes over all possible ways in which
country n can procure the tradable goods conditional on using diusive technology, which allows
for technology diusion from i to the production country (intermediary country) m for all possible
fi;mg combinations.
Then I derive an expression for the price index of tradable aggregates pmn,
pmn(w) = CB
 
IX
i=1
 ni
! 
 (CB)
0@ IX
i=1
0@ wi pmi(w)1 
kni
! 1=
Ei +minm
 
wmpmm(w)
1 
bmiknm
! 1=
Di
1A1A 
(3.13)
where i;m = 1; :::; I, and C is the constant dened in Appendix A.
Following Alvarez and Lucas (2007), I view (3.13) as a system of I equations in the prices
pm = (pm1; pm2; :::; pmI), to be solved for pm as a function of the wage vector w. This price index
expression can be compared with the price formula (7) and (9) in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and the
price formula (3.8) in Alvarez and Lucas (2007). The dierence is the second term in RHS due to
technology diusion. Without diusion, letting all technology be exclusive (Ei = i, i = 1; 2; :::; I),
the model is collapsed to Alvarez and Lucas (2007). Note that now with diusion, both trade costs
k and diusion barriers b impact the price index.
The analysis in Section 2.2 to compute total imports of goods by country n from country i is
still valid except for three changes. First, the value of intermediate goods produced with exclusive
technology in country i that are exported to country n is no longer EniXn but 
E
niX
T
n , where X
T
n is
total spending on intermediates by country n. Similarly, total imports by country n from country
i of intermediate goods produced with diusive technology are now
P
j 
D
nijX
T
n . Then I have total
imports of goods by country n from i 6= n
Mni = 
E
niX
T
n +
X
j
DnijX
T
n : (3.14)
Hence, imports of goods are comprised of two parts: the tradable goods produced by exclusive
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technology captured by the rst term and the tradable goods produced by diusive technology
captured by the second term.
Next I calculate the tradables expenditure shares for each country n: the fraction Dni of country
n's total per capita spending pmnQn on tradables that is spent on goods from country i. Since
XTn = pmnQnLn, from (3.14) and (3.13) I have the expression of bilateral merchandise import share
in total spending on tradable goods Dni
Dni = 
E
ni +
X
j
Dnij
= (CB) 1=
8<:
 
wi pmi(w)
1 
pmn(w)kni
! 1=
Ei +
X
j
24yDnij minm
 
wmpmm(w)
1 
pmn(w)bmjknm
! 1=
Dj
359=;
(3.15)
Note that
P
iDni =
P
i 
E
ni+
P
i
P
j y
D
nij
D
nj
n
= 1 because
P
i y
D
nij = 1. Also note that "complementary
slackness" conditions mentioned in Section 2.2 still hold. Equation (3.15) can be compared with
the import share formula (3.10) in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and the dierence is the second term
in RHS due to technology diusion. When all technology is exclusive technology (i.e., Ei = i),
(3.15) is exactly the same formula with the one in Alvarez and Lucas (2007).
Next, I calculate the total value associated with inward technology diusion MDni from country
i to country n. Compared to the simple model with only tradable sector, now MDni is comprised of
two parts: inward technology diusion used in tradable goods, MD;Tni , plus the corresponding value
for consumption goods, MD;NTni ,
MDni =M
D;T
ni +M
D;NT
ni =
X
j
DjniX
T
j +
'Dni
'n
Xn (3.16)
and 'n  'Enn +
P
i '
D
ni, where '
E
nn = (c
NT
n )
 1=En reects the impact of exclusive technology on
nontradable goods, and 'Dni = (c
NT
ni )
 1=Di reects the impact of diusive technology on nontrad-
able goods. The second term in 'n suggests that country n can use diusive technology from all
possible technology source country i in its nontradable sector. This changes the price of consump-
tion goods.
Total spending on nal goods by country n is Xn = wnLn. It can be shown that total spending
on tradable intermediate goods is XTn =

1 


Xn, derived from the share formula (A.15) and
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(A.18) in Appendix A. Thus total merchandise imports by country n from i are
Mni =

1  

0@Eni +X
j
Dnij
1AwnLn (3.17)
Imposing trade balance condition yields
X
i 6=n
Mni =
X
i6=n
Min (3.18)
Aggregate imports for country n are simply Mn =
P
i6=nMni. Trade share for country n is
Vn =Mn=(wnLn) or Vn = (1 Dnn)(1 )=. Diusion share for country n is V Dn =MDn =(wnLn) =
(
P
i6=nM
D
ni)=(wnLn). The bilateral diusion share in country n's total spending is simplyM
D
ni=(wnLn).
I can also rewrite the above trade balance condition in more detail. Under the trade balance
assumption, the dollar payments for tradables owing into n from the rest of the world must equal
the payments owing out of n to the rest of the world. Firms in n spend a total of XTn = pmnQnLn
dollars on tradables. The amount pmnQnLn
PI
i=1Dni = pmnQnLn reaches sellers in all countries.
Buyers in country i spend a total of pmiQiLiDin dollars for tradables from n. Thus trade balance
requires
pmnQnLn =
IX
i=1
pmiQiLiDin: (3.19)
Solving the equilibrium involves nding the zeros of a system Z(w):
Zn(w) =
1
wn
"
IX
i=1
Liwi(1  )Din(w)  Lnwn(1  )
#
(3.20)
As in the closed economy analysis of Section 3.1, the full set of equilibrium prices and quantities are
determined once equilibrium wages are known.28 Once the prices are determined, the equilibrium
quantities can be derived as in the closed economy analysis. The detailed derivation of equilibrium
is contained in Appendix B.
A competitive equilibrium is characterized by a wage vector w 2 Rn++ such that Zn(w) = 0 for
n = 1; :::; I, where, the price functions for tradable goods pmn(w) satisfy (3.13), the price functions
for nontradable goods pfn satisfy pfn = C'
 
n , the bilateral import share functions Dni(w) satisfy
(3.15), the goods imports from country i to n satisfy (3.17), and the technology diusion from
28Alvarez and Lucas (2007) provide a proof that there exists a unique solution to (3.15), given tradable goods
prices.
21
country i to n satises (3.16).
4 Benchmark
I calibrate the model's parameters using data on the value of merchandise trade imports, the value
of payments associated with inward technology diusion (represented by the payments associated
with imports of international trade in royalties, license fees, and information intensive services),
GDP size (as percentage of world GDP), and real GDP per capita for a sample of 31 countries. The
calibrated model is used as a benchmark to perform some counterfactual exercises to quantitatively
analyze the welfare gains from reducing trade costs and diusion barriers.
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Figure 2: The magnitude of technology diusion as % of GDP across countries
4.1 Data Description
The sample is comprised of 31 countries, which include nineteen OECD countries plus 12 other
countries. The nineteen OECD countries are the U.S., Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom,
Italy, Canada, Spain, Australia, Netherlands, Belgium/Luxemburg, Sweden, Austria, Denmark,
Norway, Finland, Greece, Portugal, and New Zealand.29 The other 12 countries are China, Brazil,
Mexico, India, Russia, Argentina, Switzerland, Turkey, South Africa, Israel, Ireland and Hungary.
29These 19 OECD countries are also the ones considered by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Ramondo and Rodrguez-
Clare (2009).
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These countries were selected since they are all signicant as percentage of world GDP and they
all have large aggregate knowledge stock.30 Also, those 31 countries are those which report data on
the trade in royalties and license fees plus information intensive services, compared to the sample
in Alvarez and Lucas (2007).31
All data are averages over 1990-2000 (see Appendix C). I use merchandise trade imports as
percentage of GDP from UNCTAD as the empirical counterpart for the trade share Vi for country
i in the model. Data on international technology diusion are constructed based on the payments
data of royalties and license fees trade, trade in computer and information services, and trade in
communications services from UNCTAD.32 The value of inward technology diusion as percentage
of GDP is the empirical counterpart for inward diusion share V Di for country i in the model.
33
Figure 2 illustrates that inward technology diusion as a percentage of GDP is as high as 16.3%
in Ireland and is on average 4% in the sample.34 The size of GDP as a percentage of world GDP
from World Development Indicators (WDI) is the target of Liwi (normalized) for country i in the
model.35 Another moment condition I used is the real GDP per capita (PPP adjusted), from Penn
World Table. In the model, this variable is the ratio of (wiLi)=pfi to population in country i and
population data are obtained from UNCTAD.36 Variable Li is adjusted employment size rather than
real population. This variable captures the total number of \equipped-eciency" units available
for production in the present model without capital; thus, Li as employment must be adjusted
to account for human and physical capital available per worker (Ramondo and Rodrguez-Clare,
2009). Following Alvarez and Lucas (2007), I calibrate Li with i.
37
30I use dierent indicators of knowledge stock, for example, the total number of patents in the country, the total
number of patent citations the country receives, and the aggregate royalties and license fees trade (i.e., the sum of
the inward and outward royalties and license fees).
31I try to compare my results with Alvarez and Lucas (2007) which contains 60 countries. Among them, those
31 countries report the data on international technology diusion. Among them, only some OCED countries report
bilateral technology diusion ows. While most developing countries and emerging markets do not report bilateral
technology diusion ows with their trading partners. Therefore, in the calibration part I will focus on country-specic
diusion rather than bilateral diusion.
32I also include trade in personal services (e.g. fees for training/provision of courses overseas, teachers abroad,
etc.) in technology diusion since ows of knowledge involve talent migration and human capital training. But the
magnitude of this part is small.
33The diusion share in the model and diusion share in the data are dened slightly dierently. V Di in the model is
the value of goods produced by diusive technologies from abroad. V Di in the data is the value associated with inward
knowledge movement, i.e., import of royalties and license fees plus information intensive services. Using this data
potentially underestimates the real diusion, since payments of royalties and license fees plus information intensive
services usually capture part of the nal value of goods produced by diusive technologies. To check the potential
impact of this, I examine an alternative calibration in the robustness checks (see Section 5 and Table 15) and nd
that the main results are not sensitive.
34This magnitude is even larger than R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP. For example, during the same
period, all OECD countries spent around 2.1% of GDP on R&D expenditures.
35GDP in current dollars (Data source: WDI 2009 online database, average 1990-2000).
36Data source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2008).
37Alvarez and Lucas (2007) pursue two approaches to calibrating  and L. First, they assume that  is proportional
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4.2 Calibration Procedure
My procedure is to calibrate some of the model's parameters: knowledge stock (technology state)
parameter i, country-specic trade costs ki, country-specic diusion barriers bi, and the share of
diusive knowledge in the overall knowledge stock Di .
38 I use the data on trade share, diusion
share, real GDP per capita, and GDP as a percentage of world GDP for 31 countries. To reduce
the number of parameters to calibrate, I assume that the proportion of diusive knowledge is the
same across countries, Ei + 
D
i = i, 
D
i =i = 
D.
The resulting set of parameters to calibrate is
 =
n
figIi=1 ; D; fkigIi=1 ; fbigIi=1 ; ; ; 
o
:
I set the labor share in the tradable sector, , to 0.5, and the labor share in the nal sector, ,
to 0.75, as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007). I select a value of 0.15 for parameter , which is the value
used in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) as a baseline. This is the preferred value based on the following
information. The parameter  reects the variability of productivity across countries. The selected
baseline value of  lies in the middle of empirical estimates. Eaton and Kortum (2002) estimate
 using bilateral trade data as well as prices of individual goods. Their estimates for  are in the
range 0.08-0.28, and their preferred value is 0.12. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) conclude
that a reasonable range for the estimates of the Armington substitution elasticity is [5; 10], which
corresponds to  2 [0:11; 0:25].39 Based on these ndings, as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007), I choose
 = 0:15 as the preferred value. See Table 1 for the denition of parameters in the model and how
to set their values.
My calibration procedure is as follows. First, given ; ; , the initial guess of other parameters
in , and the vector of country GDP sizes as percentage of world GDP, I compute the model's
equilibrium, and generate a simulated data set for the following variables: trade shares, diusion
shares, the real GDP per capita, and the country's GDP share in the world. The algorithm used
to L and calibrate both to match a country's share of nominal world GDP. The second approach uses relative price
data to calibrate  and L separately. They found that both approaches produce similar results. In this paper, I use
the rst approach as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) to match countries size in world GDP distribution.
38To estimate trade costs and diusion barriers, I do two steps. First, I calibrate the simplest version of the model
under the assumption of uniform trade cost k and diusion barrier b. The purpose of the rst step is nding some
reasonable intervals for the nal optimal values to save the computation time. Second, I calibrate country-specic
trade costs and diusion barriers.
39This is because the connection between these two parameterizations is  = 1=(   1), based on the bilateral
gravity formula.
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Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Denition Value
 labor share (non-tradable) 0.75 (Alvarez and Lucas, 2007)
 labor share (tradable) 0.5 (Alvarez and Lucas, 2007)
 variability of 0.12 (Eaton and Kortum, 2002)
productivity draws 0.15 (Alvarez and Lucas, 2007)
Di share of diusive technology assume 
D
i = 
D
recovered from real GDP per capita
i technology state (total stock of knowledge) i  Li
Li adjusted employment (size) recovered from GDP share in the world
kni trade costs b/w n and i recovered from trade share
bni diusion barriers b/w n and i recovered from diusion share
to compute the model's equilibrium extends the one in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) using contract
mapping to nd a xed point of wages w that solves for the vector of price index pm(w).
40 The
calibration searches for: (1) the technology state parameters (also the stock of knowledge)

Ii=1
	
recovered from the GDP share in the world such that the absolute dierence of GDP share between
the model prediction and the real data is minimized, as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007);41 (2) the share
of diusive knowledge in overall knowledge stock D, the trade costs ki and the diusion barriers
bi such that the sum of the square dierence of real GDP per capita (gdppi), trade shares (Vi) and
diusion shares (V Di ) for all countries between the model and the data is minimized,
IX
i=1

]gdpp
data
i  ]gdpp
model
i
2
+
IX
i=1
eV datai   eV modeli 2 + IX
i=1
gV Di data  gV Di model2 :
In each simulation, I recover technology state parameters

Ii=1
	
from the country's GDP size
as percentage in the world, and use three other moment conditions (real GDP per capita, trade
share and diusion share for each country) to pin down country-specic trade costs ki, country-
specic diusion barriers bi, and the share of diusive knowledge in overall knowledge stock 
D. It is
worth noting that the three moment conditions are jointly determined by these three parameters.
The whole nonlinear system is comprised of 93(=313) nonlinear equations and 63(=312+1)
unknowns.
A measure of the explanatory power of the model for trade shares R2V , diusion shares R
2
V D
,
40The algorithm is described below. First, given the vector of wages w, there exists a function pm(w) that solves
for the vector of price index pm. Second, there is a mapping w
0 = T (w; yT ) whose xed point, w = F (yD), gives the
equilibrium wages given a 3-dimension matrix yDnij . This 3-dimension matrix y
D captures the relationship between
the technology source country, the production country as intermediary, and the destination consumption country in
tradable goods sector. Then the nal step is to solve for the whole equilibrium.
41For simplicity, I follow Alvarez and Lucas (2007) to assume that i  Li.
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country's GDP size, R2GDP and real GDP per capita R
2
gdpp, respectively, is given by:
R2H = 1 
PI
i=1
 eHdatai   eHmodeli 2PI
i=1
 eHdatai 2 (4.1)
whereH = V; V D; GDP; gdpp. I will report both the explanatory power and the correlation between
the real data and the model generated results in Section 4.3.
The chosen moments are informative about the model's parameters. Intuitively, the sources
of identication are as follows. First,  is the total stock of knowledge, which is believed to be
proportional to the size of an economy, as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007). Therefore, I use GDP
size as a percentage of world GDP to pinpoint . Second, diusion barriers have a greater eect
on diusion shares, while trade costs have a greater eect on trade shares, even though the trade
shares and the diusion shares are jointly determined by both trade costs and diusion barriers.
Third, the share of diusive knowledge is related to real GDP per capita. Increasing the share of
diusive knowledge D eectively increases real GDP per capita, and changing the value of real
GDP per capita leads to a change in the share of diusive knowledge. Hence, I use real GDP
per capita as a moment condition to identify diusive knowledge share. In calibration, the last
three moment conditions are jointly used to identify diusion barriers, trade costs, and the share
of diusive knowledge.
4.3 Benchmark Results
Table 2 reports the calibrated parameters for the benchmark. The calibrated trade cost ki is, on
average, 0.54, which is equivalent to adding 85% tari or shipping costs. This estimate is broadly
consistent with the value of trade costs used in the existing literature. Alvarez and Lucas (2007) do
not calibrate the value of trade costs and used k = 0:75, applied symmetrically to country pairs i; j
with i 6= j. The value 0:75 does not include the eect of taris. Considering taris, the real value
of k is lower than 0:75. Furthermore, Alvarez and Lucas (2007) also note that other statistical
evidence can support k values (trade costs) as low as 0.65. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)
report that for a representative developed country, trade barriers fall in a range between 40{80%,
depending on the approach and elasticity of substitution. Waugh (2010) nds even larger trade
costs: the median trade cost for OECD countries is equivalent to a 90% tari, which is equivalent
to the value of trade costs k of 0.53. My estimate for trade costs is within these reasonable ranges.
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Table 2: Parameters (31 countries with country-specic ki and bi)
Parameterized
Parameter Denition Value Previous literature
 labor share (non-tradable) 0.75 0.75 (Alvarez and Lucas, 2007)
 labor share (tradable) 0.5 0.5 (Alvarez and Lucas, 2007)
 variability of productivity 0.15 0.12-0.28 (Eaton and Kortum, 2002)
Calibrated
Parameter Denition Value Previous literature
D share of diusive technology 0.14 N/A
ki trade cost 0.54 0.75 plus tari (Alvarez and Lucas, 2007)
(average 31 countries) 0.65 from statistical evidence
bi diusion barriers 0.45 N/A
(average 31 countries)
The calibrated value of average diusion barriers is b = 0:45. This implies that the barriers to
technology diusion among the sample countries are larger than the trade costs. This result is quite
interesting because it contradicts some general conjectures by the public that knowledge ows might
take more advantage of communication technology and that it might therefore be the case that, even
though knowledge ows entail barriers, those barriers are lower than the barriers to merchandise
trade ows. However, this paper provides an opposite answer. It specically investigates the
diusion barriers in which technology diusion occurs through market transactions, which can be
viewed as trade in knowledge in a general sense. The calibrated diusion barriers are larger than
merchandise trade costs, which means that merchandise trade is less costly compared to trade in
knowledge.
The calibrated proportion of diusive knowledge in overall knowledge stock is 0.14, which
means that roughly 86% of knowledge stock is exclusive to its home country and that only a
small proportion of knowledge is currently used by foreign countries through market transactions
of diusion. This large share of exclusive technology is consistent with the conventional assumption
in the literature of Ricardian trade, which implicitly assumes that all technology is exclusive (e.g.,
Alvarez and Lucas, 2007; Eaton and Kortum, 2002).
Table 3: Goodness of Fit: Calibrated Model
Model's \Explanatory power":
merchandise trade shares 0.97
technology diusion shares 1.00
real GDP per capita 0.96
GDP size 1.00
Correlations between model and data:
merchandise trade shares 0.92
technology diusion shares 1.00
real GDP per capita 0.97
GDP size 1.00
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Table 3 reports the model's explanatory power and the correlation between the model and the
data. The calibrated model does a very good job in matching GDP size and technology diusion
share as percentage of GDP, and the tness for merchandise trade share and real GDP capita is also
above 95% in terms of explanatory power. In a model without technology diusion, the correlation
coecient between the model generated merchandise trade and the data is 0.59, as in Alvarez and
Lucas (2007). My model generates the correlation as high as 0.92 for merchandise trade share (as
a percentage of a country's GDP). My model replicates most countries very well: if Belgium and
Luxembourg are excluded, the explanatory power for merchandise trade share increases to 0.97,
and the correlation between the model and the data becomes 0.93.42 Figure 3-4 also report the
tness of data and the model. In Figure 3, the left panel compares countries' GDP sizes between
the model and the data. If the model's GDP size is the same as that of the data, then the ordered
pairs would map out a 45o line. Figure 3 shows that the ordered pairs of GDP size lay on the 45o
line. The model also replicates real GDP per capita across countries fairly well. For example, the
model predicts that Finland has a real GDP per capita level that is 0.662 of the U.S. level. In the
data, Finland has a real GDP per capita level that is 0.663 of the U.S. level.
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Figure 3: Country's GDP size and real GDP per capita (Model and Data).
Table 8 reports trade costs, diusion barriers, GDP size, and technology parameters by country
(see Appendix C). For most countries in the world, calibrated diusion barriers are larger than
merchandise trade costs. However, there are some exceptions; for example, Japan and Switzerland
have smaller diusion barriers than trade costs for goods. Japan usually faces larger trade costs
compared to most other European and North American countries because it is isolated from other
countries. At the same time, Japan is one of the largest technology producers in the world and has
42Belgium and Luxembourg is an outlier which has merchandise trade share as high as 59%.
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Figure 4: Merchandise trade and technology diusion shares vs. GDP size (Model and Data).
relatively large knowledge stock. Switzerland is dierent from other European countries in terms
of its distinct intellectual property law system, which helps its market transactions of technology
diusion. It is therefore unsurprising that Japan and Switzerland have smaller diusion barriers
than merchandise trade costs.
Furthermore, diusion barriers show less variation across countries than do trade costs: the
variance of trade costs (0.016) is almost four times that of diusion barriers (0.004). This suggests
that trade costs for goods are more asymmetric across countries while countries are facing more
equalization in technology diusion barriers. The potential reasons are as follows. Merchandise
trade is more likely aected by physical trade barriers such as geographic ones, which include
distance and borders. Such physical barriers are hard to diminish, and to some extent, they are
inherent characteristics of a country. Conversely, even though physical distance and borders can
also impede knowledge ows, technology diusion might be more aected by institutional, cultural,
and legal factors, for example, human capital levels and the legislation of intellectual property
right. Such factors are amenable to change by policy instruments. My sample does not include
many less developed countries; therefore, the dierences between those factors across countries are
not as large as the barriers to merchandise trade. Further exploration of dierent factors that could
impede technology diusion and the importance of each factor are outside the scope of this paper,
and these issues are left for future research.
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5 Counterfactual Exercises
In order to quantitatively examine the change in welfare gains and the cross-country distribution
of GDP from reducing trade costs and diusion barriers, I perform two counterfactual exercises
based on the benchmark model. First, what would happen if trade costs and diusion barriers were
eliminated? I consider three cases: only removing diusion barriers, only removing trade costs, and
removing both trade costs and diusion barriers. Second, what would happen if the world moved
to autarky? I also consider three subcases here: only abolishing diusion, only abolishing trade,
and complete isolation (abolishing both trade and diusion).
Welfare Gains
I use the two counterfactual exercises to analyze the change of welfare gains in terms of both
consumption equivalence and real GDP per capita. Table 4 presents the change of consumption
equivalence under dierent scenarios.43 I nd that the welfare boom from free diusion (i.e., b
goes to 1) is larger than that from free trade (i.e., k goes to 1). I use log change in percentage
to denote the change of welfare. The consumption increment from removing diusion barriers
is, on average, 34%, which is larger than the average welfare increase from removing trade costs,
25%. Unsurprisingly, removing both trade costs and diusion barriers present the largest welfare
increase, which is, on average across countries, 60%. It is also interesting to examine the change
from the current benchmark to autarky. Abolishing only merchandise trade (i.e., k goes to 0) leads
to more welfare losses compared to abolishing diusion alone (i.e., b goes to 0), and most of the
welfare loss of moving to autarky (i.e., abolishing both trade and diusion) is due to abolishing
merchandise trade. This suggests that the world may have already exploited more benets of
merchandise trade cost reduction than from diusion barrier reduction (i.e., from prohibitive trade
costs or from prohibitive diusion barriers to the benchmark), while in future, the potential gains
from free diusion are larger than from free trade (i.e., from the benchmark to free diusion or to
free trade). The implication of this nding is that greater investigation of policy instruments that
may reduce diusion barriers may be warranted. Table 9 reports the change in welfare gains by
country (see Appendix C).
The welfare gains from free merchandise trade alone are consistent with those of Alvarez and
Lucas (2007). For example, Alvarez and Lucas (2007) calculated the upper bounds of gains of
moving from autarky to free trade in terms of consumption equivalence for the U.S., Japan, and
43In the model, the consumption equivalence is equal to the real wage w=pf .
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Table 4: Welfare Gains (%)
(consumption equivalence)
(log(con1=con0))  100
From benchmark to: Average 31 countries Maximum among 31 countries
free trade and free diusion 59.55 113.58
(k = 1; b = 1)
only free trade in goods 25.28 37.92
(k = 1)
only free technology diusion 33.60 59.30
(b = 1)
shutting down trade in goods -5.18 -17.78
(k = 0)
shutting down technology diusion -0.62 -2.67
(b = 0)
shutting down both -5.80 -20.45
(k = 0; b = 0)
Denmark as 10%, 14%, and 38%, respectively. My results of gains of moving from autarky to
free merchandise trade for these three countries are 10%, 15%, and 36%, respectively. When both
diusion and trade are permitted, the overall gains are larger: 15% for the U.S., 25% for Japan,
and 77% for Denmark. Here, small countries benet more than large countries do from both
merchandise trade and technology diusion because of the market size eect. Once trade costs or
diusion barriers are eliminated, countries enjoy the global market without friction. The result is
that small countries can benet from larger outside markets than they were able to previously, while
big countries (e.g., the U.S., Japan) already have large domestic markets and thus benet less from
reducing trade costs or diusion barriers. This market size eect occurs both in merchandise trade
and technology diusion. Therefore, when diusion is included, a small country (e.g., Denmark)
enjoys a larger welfare increase than do big countries (e.g., the U.S. and Japan).
The results can be also compared with the literature on gains from global technology diusion
without diusion barriers. For example, Rodrguez-Clare (2007) calculated the overall gains from
both trade and diusion to be between 206% and 240% for a country with approximately 1% of
the world's GDP. My results for overall gains from trade and diusion for a similar country are
around 69%-73%. The gains from diusion in this paper are smaller than those of Rodrguez-
Clare (2007) for two reasons. First, Rodrguez-Clare (2007) bases his work on the growth rate of a
country, and no data associated with technology diusion are directly used in that paper. I used
market transaction data to directly quantify the gains from technology diusion, resulting in their
precise lower bound. Second, technology diusion entails no trade costs or diusion barriers in
the literature. Therefore, gains from diusion in this paper should be smaller than those based on
Rodrguez-Clare (2007).
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Table 5: Change of Real GDP Per Capita (%)
(log(gdpp1=gdpp0))  100
From benchmark to: Average 31 countries Maximum among 31 countries
free trade and free diusion 46.16 100.19
(k = 1; b = 1)
only free trade in goods 16.71 29.35
(k = 1)
only free technology diusion 28.79 54.50
(b = 1)
shutting down trade in goods -3.90 -16.66
(k = 0)
shutting down technology diusion -0.52 -2.54
(b = 0)
shutting down both -4.46 -19.20
(k = 0; b = 0)
Table 6: Dispersion of Real GDP Per Capita
Scenario var[log(gdpp)] gdpp90=gdpp10 Gini index
Benchmark 1.3943 10.2352 0.3564
free technology diusion 1.3613 8.5727 0.3415
free trade in goods 1.3487 8.8042 0.3483
Another measure of welfare gains is real GDP per capita, reported in Table 5. The results are
consistent with the consumption equivalence measure: the increase of real GDP per capita from free
diusion is larger than that from free trade, and abolishing trade leads to larger welfare losses than
does abolishing diusion. The change in real GDP per capita by country is reported in Appendix
C (Table 8).
The nontradable sector plays a key role in the gains from diusion. If there is no productivity
shock in nontradable goods, the gains from free trade (average 25.30%) will be larger than those from
free diusion (average 0.04%), but the overall gains will be smaller than those of the benchmark.
The reason is that diusive technology has a limited eect on tradable goods due to the substitution
eect between merchandise trade and technology diusion in tradable goods. That is, obtaining
foreign technology to produce goods locally decreases the incentive to import goods. Because
technology diusion substitutes for merchandise trade, diusion of technology benets a sector
the goods of which are not tradable more than it does a sector the goods of which are tradable.
If no productivity shocks occur in nontradable sectors, it shuts down substantial channel for the
impact of technology diusion. Table 10 reports the welfare comparison result from only allowing
for productivity shocks in the tradable sector (see Appendix C).
Cross-country Distribution of GDP
I examine the change in cross-country distribution of GDP in terms of real GDP per capita. Free
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merchandise trade and free technology diusion increase real GDP per capita by 5{30% and 4{55%,
respectively. In both cases, the dispersion of real GDP per capita across countries is reduced. Table
6 provides some summary statistics: the variance of log real GDP per capita, the 90/10 percentile
ratio, and the Gini index across countries. Except for the variance of log real GDP per capita, the
summary statistics indicate that free diusion contributes only slightly more to the reduction of
dispersion of GDP across countries than does free trade. The Gini index of real GDP per capita
across countries is decreased by 4% due to moving from the benchmark to free technology diusion
and by 2% due to moving from the benchmark to free merchandise trade. This is consistent with
the rst nding that free technology diusion generates larger gains than does free merchandise
trade. Table 11 in Appendix C presents the change of real GDP per capita by country. The market
size eect also impacts the change of real GDP per capita. Table 11 shows that some small rich
countries (e.g., Norway, Finland) benet more than do relatively poor, big countries (e.g., China,
India).
Impact of Diusion on Trade Flows
I examine the change of trade volume due to the change of diusion barriers to investigate
the impact of diusion on trade ows. Table 12 in Appendix C presents the trade shares by
country under dierent scenarios. By only removing the diusion barriers, the trade shares slightly
increase for all countries. Removing trade costs substantially increases trade shares. Finally, by
removing both trade costs and diusion barriers, trade shares reach their highest levels. The
underlying mechanism is that free diusion makes countries more likely obtain higher productivity
draws from abroad through diusion. In an asymmetric world, this encourages countries to be
more specialized in production, and many countries will serve as intermediaries that export goods
produced by foreign technology. Therefore, diusion improves countries' potential ability to export
goods to global markets. This is the complementarity eect, resulting in trade shares increasing
after the removal of diusion barriers.
This result is dierent from the analysis in Section 2 under symmetry because no intermediary
countries exist in a symmetric world; therefore, only the substitution eect exists. This means that
for tradable goods, if a country obtains more foreign technology through diusion to produce goods
locally, its incentive to import those goods decreases. My quantitative result suggests that in an
asymmetric world, the substitution eect is dominated by the complementarity eect. This implies
that removing diusion barriers has \spillover" eects on merchandise trade, which supports the
rst two ndings about the change in welfare and in real GDP per capita due to the removal of trade
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costs and diusion barriers. In summary, free diusion has greater welfare impact and contributes
more to reducing the dispersion of real GDP per capita than does free merchandise trade.
Robustness
One potential issue is that the diusive technology share D might depend on diusion barriers,
and therefore should not be viewed as xed in the experiments. The reason is that reducing
diusion barriers potentially makes diusion more likely across national borders, and increases
diusive technology share. Then the eect of free diusion might be magnied. If so, the previous
results for the eect of removing the diusion barriers would be the lower bound of the real eect
of free diusion. In that case, the welfare eect of free diusion is downward biased. This share
of diusive technology is also related to extensive margin in technology market. It is interesting
to compare the extensive margin (how much technology at aggregate level is diused) and the
intensive margin (how much technology diusion each rm obtains). The task is promising and
challenging where more technology diusion data at rm level are needed.
To alleviate the D problem as well as to check the sensitivity of calibration results, I recalibrate
the model using dierent values of D (see Table 13).44 The value for trade costs is stable, and
does not change much according to dierent values of diusive technology share D. The value
of diusion barriers b is decreasing when D goes to 1. This implies that if more technology is
diusive, in order to t the current world, higher diusion barriers are necessary. In the extreme
case (see Table 14), when the share of diusive technology reaches closer to 1, the value of diusion
barriers is around 0.13. This gives out the average welfare gains from removing diusion barriers
as 34.8%, just a bit larger than the average gains in the benchmark 33.6% (see Table 4).45 But
it increases the maximum welfare increment to 82.1%, compared to the previous value 59.3% in
Table 4. Therefore, it is safely to say that the average welfare increment from free diusion is not
sensitive to the value change of diusive technology share D.
To check the potential impact of slightly dierent denition of diusion share, I examine an
alternative calibration method.46 I use the data of import of royalties and license fees only, to
calculate the value of goods produced by diusive technology based on royalties and license fees.
According to the statistical analysis of royalty rates from the Licensing Executives Society, many
industries use about 5% of the selling price as a typical royalty rate, but rates can vary from 0.1 to
44I use uniform trade costs and diusion barriers in the sensitivity tests to save computation time.
45Meanwhile, it is not surprising to note that assuming all technology as diusive technology suppresses the gains
from free trade compared to the benchmark.
46Also see footnote 29.
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25% or more and depend on the industry. I use average 5% royalty rate to calculate the value of
goods produced by diusive technology (V Di ) for all countries except for Ireland. I use the average
royalty rate 20% (software industry) for Ireland. By this way, I construct a rough measure of total
value of goods produced by diusive technology using imports of royalties and license fees. Its share
of GDP is on average 8% in the sample, which doubles the previous data on royalties and license fees
plus information intensive services. This is a royalty-calculated method. Because not all royalties
and license fees are through royalty rate, some of them are xed fees. It is possible to overestimate
the real value of goods produced by diusive technology. To be safe, in the benchmark, I use the
rst method based on payments associated with trade in royalties and license fees plus information
intensive services. Those payments are on average 4% of GDP in the sample. I report the results
from the royalty-calculated method in Table 15 which presents the results of welfare changes using
the larger diusion share data by royalty-calculated method to recalibrate the model and to redo
the counterfactual exercises. It turns out that the main results are still robust: the welfare gains
from free technology diusion are still larger than the gains from free trade. Both the average and
maximum welfare gains do not change much and are consistent with the intuition, i.e., increasing
diusion share slightly increases the gains from free diusion and decreases the gains from free
trade. The overall gains from free both diusion and trade are increased.
6 Conclusion
This paper constructs and calibrates a general equilibrium model to assess the impact of technology
diusion and merchandise trade on welfare gains and cross-country distribution of GDP. The model
features some countries as intermediaries that export goods produced by foreign technology through
diusion. In the model, the merchandise trade share and technology diusion share are jointly
determined in equilibrium. Using the data on payments associated with international technology
diusion, I calibrate the model to match the world GDP distribution, the technology diusion
shares, the merchandise trade shares, and real GDP per capita for a sample of 31 countries. The
calibrated model replicates the technology diusion and merchandise trade patterns, as well as
GDP size and real GDP per capita across countries, fairly well.
I nd that the welfare gains from removing diusion barriers are generally larger than those
from removing merchandise trade costs. This implies that the world has so far exploited more of
the potential gains from reductions in the barriers to merchandize trade than the potential gains
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from reductions in the barriers to technology diusion. Potential gains from further reduction of
barriers to technology diusion in the future are therefore higher than those from further reduction
in trade costs. Removing diusion barriers also increases merchandise trade, because countries
are more likely to achieve higher productivity from obtaining foreign technology through diusion
and therefore improve their ability to export to the global market. In summary, free technology
diusion has greater welfare impact and contributes more to reducing the dispersion of real GDP
per capita than does free merchandise trade. This calls for more attention to be paid to policies
that help to reduce diusion barriers.
The main contribution of this paper is the quantitative assessment of the welfare impact of
technology diusion and trade, as well as their impact on cross-country distribution of GDP, using
market transaction data on technology diusion and introducing diusion barriers. It contributes to
the literature exploring the gains from trade and to the literature simultaneously examining trade
and technology diusion. There are also some limitations. One concern is that the model assumes
exogenous knowledge stock and that countries use existing knowledge for technology diusion. If
this assumption were relaxed, Eaton and Kortum (2006) predict that the gains from merchandise
trade would not be aected by endogenous research eorts. However, the gains from technology
diusion have not been studied in the presence of endogenous knowledge creation. It is expected
that endogenous knowledge creation would provide an incentive to knowledge producers and would
potentially impact the pattern of technology specialization and diusion process across countries.
A thorough analysis of this issue seems fruitful and is left for future research. Another limitation
is that the current ndings are based on the assumption that country-specic diusion barriers
and trade costs exist between each country and the rest of the world as its partner. A more
satisfactory model should capture bilateral diusion barriers and trade costs between country pairs.
If bilateral diusion data are available, I can use the model to analyze the interaction between
bilateral technology diusion and bilateral merchandise trade. Finally, addressing the issue of
extensive versus intensive margins in the technology market is also a direction worthy of exploring
in future research. For this endeavor, it would be useful to acquire and construct rm-level data
on payments associated with technology diusion.
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A Derivation of Closed Economy Equilibrium
Let the unit price of individual tradables be p(x). Denote the unit price of aggregate composite
tradable goods by pm. Finally, let the unit price of nontradable goods be pf (~x). Producers of
all kinds will choose purchases of the individual tradable goods so as to obtain the composite
intermediate at minimum unit cost pm. Their question is
pmQ = min
q(x)

Z 1
0
e xp(x)q(x)dx
subject to 

Z 1
0
e xq(x)1 1=dx
=( 1)
 Q:
This problem is solved by the function
q(x) =


Z 1
0
e xp(u)1 du
=(1 )
p(x) Q: (A.1)
Solving q(x), it follows that the price index of composite intermediate is
pm =


Z 1
0
e xp(x)1 dx
1=(1 )
: (A.2)
The quantity of the individual tradable goods can be restated as
q(x) = pmp(x)
 Q: (A.3)
Similarly, given the price w of the labor input and the aggregate tradable goods price pm,
tradable goods producer will choose the quantity of labor and aggregate inputs so as to minimize
the expenditures on inputs. Hence, he will solve
p(x)q(x) = min
s;Qm
[ws+ pmQm]
subject to
x sQ1 m  q(x):
This problem is solved by
s(x) = x


1  
1  pm
w
1 
q(x) (A.4)
Qm(x) = x


1  

  w
pm

q(x) (A.5)
It follows that
p(x) = xBwp1 m (A.6)
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where B =  (1  ) 1. The unit cost of input bundle for tradable good is cT = Bwp1 m and
the unit price of tradable good is xcT .
Finally, given the price w of the labor input and the composite intermediate price pm, a nal
goods producer will solve
pf (~x)qf (~x) = min
sf ;Qf
[wsf + pmQf ]
subject to
~x sfQ
1 
f  qf (~x):
This problem is solved by the values
sf (~x) =


1  
1  pm
w
1 
qf (~x) (A.7)
Qf (~x) =

1  

 w
pm

qf (~x) (A.8)
It follows that the unit price p of the nal good is
pf (~x) = ~x
Awp1 m (A.9)
where A =  (1  ) 1 and the unit cost of the input bundle for nal good is cNT = Awp1 m .
The unit price of nal good is ~xcNT .
Combining (A.2) and (A.6) and using the change of variable z = x, we have
pm =


Z 1
0
e x

Bxwp1 m
1 
dx
1=(1 )
= Bwp1 m 
 
Z 1
0
e zz(1 )dz
1=(1 ) (A.10)
We write C(; ), or sometimes just C, for
C(; ) =
Z 1
0
e zz(1 )dz
1=(1 )
: (A.11)
C is a constant since the integral in brackets is the Gamma function  (), evaluated at the argument
 = 1 + (1  ). Convergence of the integral requires 1 + (1  ) > 0, which we assume to hold
throughout the paper.47 Then we rewrite (A.10) as
pm = CBw
p1 m 
 
Solving for pm yields
pm = (CB)
1= =w: (A.12)
47Rodrguez-Clare (2007) explains why this assumption holds.
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Substituting from (A.12) back into (A.6) then yields the prices of individual tradeables:
p(x) = C(1 )=B1=x (1 )=w: (A.13)
The price of the nal good is, from (A.9) and (A.12),
pf = A(CB)
(1 )=~x (1 )=w: (A.14)
To calculate the equilibrium quantities, we use the share formula as follows. The shares of labor
and intermediate inputs in the output value of each tradable good x are  and 1   respectively.
Then the same equality must obtain for the composite aggregate:
 =
w(1  sf )
pmQ
and 1   = Qm
Q
(A.15)
Using (3.7) we have Qf = Q and then the relative price formula (A.12) gives
1  sf = (CB)1= =Qf : (A.16)
Another equation of sf and Qf can be obtained from (A.7) and (A.8):
sf
Qf
=


1  
pm
w

:
Using (A.12) again, we obtain
sf
Qf
=


1  

(CB)1=  = (A.17)
Combining two equations (A.16) and (A.17), we can solve for sf and Qf :
sf =  and Qf = (1  )(CB) 1== : (A.18)
From these equations, all equilibrium quantities can be calculated, just as equilibrium prices
can be calculated from (A.12)-(A.14).
B Derivation of Open Economy Equilibrium
Let g(xE ; xD) and G(xE ; xD) be the joint density and the joint distribution respectively, of xE
and xD, where xE and xD are two vectors: xE = (xE1 ; x
E
2 ; :::; x
E
I ), x
D = (xD1 ; x
D
2 ; :::; x
D
I ). Use
qn(x
E ; xD) for the consumption of tradable good (xE ; xD) in country n, and Qn for consumption
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of the aggregates in country n,
Qn =
Z
qn(x
E ; xD)1 1=g(xE ; xD)d(xE ; xD)
=( 1)
=
Z
qn(x
E ; xD)1 1=dG(xE ; xD)
=( 1) (B.1)
Let pn(x
E ; xD) be the prices paid for tradable good (xE ; xD) by producers in country n. Let
pmn =
Z
pn(x
E ; xD)dG(xE ; xD)
1=(1 )
(B.2)
be the price in country n for a unit of the aggregate. Analogous to previous section, we have
qn(x
E ; xD) = pmnpn(x
E ; xD) Qn; n = 1; :::; I: (B.3)
All producers in n buy at the same, lowest price:
pn(x
E ; xD) = minfmin
i
(xEi )
cTi =kni;min
i;m
(xDi )
cTmi=knmg
= min

min
i
(xEi )
 c
T
i
kni
;min
i;m
(xDi )
 c
T
m
bmiknm
 (B.4)
where cTi = Bw

i p
1 
mi , i = 1; :::; I.
Then we derive an expression for pmn from (B.2) and (B.4). The derivation is based on two
properties of the exponential distribution.48 Then from (B.2), we obtain
p1 mn =
Z
pn(x
E ; xD)1 dG(xE ; xD); (B.5)
From (B.4), we have
pn(x
E ; xD)1= = B1=min
(
min
i
"
w
=
i p
(1 )=
mi
k
1=
ni
xEi
#
;min
i;m
"
w
=
m p
(1 )=
mm
(bmiknm)1=
xDi
#)
(B.6)
By properties of exponential distribution, we have that zEi  w=i p(1 )=mi k 1=ni xEi is exponen-
tially distributed with parameter
 Eni =
 
wi p
1 
mi
kni
! 1=
Ei (B.7)
48These properties are: (1) if x  exp() and k > 0 then kx  exp(=k); and (2) if x and y are independent,
x  exp() and y  exp(), then minfx; yg  exp(+ ).
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and zDi  minm
n
w
=
m p
(1 )=
mm (bmiknm)
 1=xDi
o
is exponentially distributed with parameter
 Dni = minm
 
wmp
1 
mm
bmiknm
! 1=
Di (B.8)
Then zi  minifzEi ; zDi g is exponentially distributed with parameter  ni   Eni +  Dni.49 Applying
the property of exponential distribution again yields that pn(x
E ; xD)1= is exponentially distributed
with parameter
 = B 1= n where  n 
IX
i=1
 ni
Let u = pn(x
E ; xD)1=. It then follows from (B.5) that
p1 mn = 
Z 1
0
u(1 )e udu:
Using the change of variable z = u, we obtain that
p1 mn = 
 (1 )
Z 1
0
e zz(1 )dz =  (1 )C1 
where C = C(; ) is the constant dened in section 3.1. Then
pmn(w) = CB
 
IX
i=1
 ni
! 
 (CB)
0@ IX
i=1
0@ wi pmi(w)1 
kni
! 1=
Ei +minm
 
wmpmm(w)
1 
bmiknm
! 1=
Di
1A1A 
(B.9)
where i;m = 1; :::; I.
We then calculate the total value of goods associated with inward technology diusion MDni
from country i to country n. Compared to the simple model with only tradable sector, now MDni is
comprised of two parts: technology diusion used in tradable goods, MD;Tni , plus the corresponding
value for technology diusion used in consumption goods, MD;NTni . Since these goods are non-
tradable, it is necessary to derive an expression for the share of consumption goods v bought by
country n that are produced with diused technology from country i. Hence, I need the explicit
price formula for nal goods, pf . Similar to tradable goods price (B.4), in country n
pfn(~x
E ; ~xD) = minf(~xEn )cNTn ;min
i
(~xDi )
cNTni g (B.10)
where ~xE  exp(E), ~xD  exp(D), and cNTni = cNTn =bni. Similar to equation (B.9), by properties
49Compared to Section 2 with only tradable sector, there is a positive constant correlation between  and , where
  = B  .
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of exponential distribution, I derive the price index of nontradable goods in country n
pfn = C'
 
n (B.11)
where 'n plays the similar role for consumption goods as n for intermediate goods, with
'n  'Enn +
X
i
'Dni (B.12)
where 'Enn = (c
NT
n )
 1=En reects the impact of exclusive technology on nontraded goods, and
'Dni = (c
NT
ni )
 1=Di reects the impact of diusive technology on nontraded goods. Once the prices
are determined, the equilibrium quantities can be derived as in the closed economy analysis. The
allocations in the equilibrium have been illustrated in Section 3.2.
C Data and More Tables
Table 7: Country Data (ordered by GDP size)
Country Size GDP Merchandise trade technology diusion Real GDP Relative
as % of (imports/GDP) (inward diusion/GDP) per capita population
world GDP (Vi) (V
D
i ) (US=1) (US=1)
United States 27.18 0.10 0.01 1.00 1.00
Japan 15.24 0.07 0.02 0.83 0.46
Germany 7.59 0.20 0.04 0.79 0.30
France 5.05 0.20 0.02 0.72 0.22
United Kingdom 4.31 0.23 0.04 0.69 0.21
Italy 4.20 0.17 0.03 0.73 0.21
China 2.63 0.17 0.02 0.09 4.35
Brazil 2.24 0.07 0.01 0.24 0.59
Canada 2.21 0.28 0.04 0.76 0.11
Spain 2.08 0.19 0.02 0.60 0.14
Mexico 1.40 0.25 0.02 0.27 0.34
Russia 1.39 0.15 0.03 0.27 0.54
Netherland 1.33 0.45 0.07 0.80 0.06
Australia 1.29 0.16 0.03 0.72 0.07
India 1.29 0.10 0.01 0.07 3.48
Switzerland 0.95 0.28 0.03 0.95 0.03
Belgium and Luxembourg 0.94 0.59 0.08 0.79 0.04
Argentina 0.90 0.08 0.02 0.35 0.13
Sweden 0.89 0.24 0.05 0.73 0.03
Turkey 0.87 0.15 0.02 0.17 0.23
Austria 0.73 0.30 0.09 0.83 0.03
Denmark 0.58 0.25 0.04 0.76 0.02
Norway 0.51 0.22 0.05 0.89 0.02
Greece 0.50 0.19 0.02 0.52 0.04
South Africa 0.48 0.19 0.02 0.23 0.15
Finland 0.44 0.23 0.05 0.66 0.02
Portugal 0.38 0.31 0.03 0.48 0.04
Israel 0.32 0.30 0.05 0.60 0.02
Ireland 0.25 0.47 0.16 0.66 0.01
New Zealand 0.19 0.23 0.05 0.55 0.01
Hungary 0.15 0.43 0.07 0.33 0.04
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Table 8: Country's technology state, GDP, trade costs, and diusion barriers
country i GDP GDP merchandise technology
(calibrated) (data) (model) trade costs diusion barriers
(calibrated) (calibrated)
United States 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6599 0.5878
Japan 0.5008 0.5609 0.5609 0.3541 0.5459
Germany 0.3379 0.2793 0.2793 0.6969 0.5928
France 0.2341 0.1856 0.1856 0.6481 0.5146
United Kingdom 0.2045 0.1585 0.1585 0.6739 0.5370
Italy 0.1975 0.1544 0.1544 0.6020 0.5181
China 0.1299 0.0966 0.0966 0.5528 0.4363
Brazil 0.1053 0.0823 0.0823 0.4025 0.4022
Canada 0.1130 0.0815 0.0815 0.6690 0.4905
Spain 0.1062 0.0764 0.0764 0.5662 0.4562
Mexico 0.0755 0.0517 0.0517 0.5851 0.4092
Russia 0.0734 0.0512 0.0512 0.4754 0.4534
Netherland 0.0642 0.0488 0.0488 0.8777 0.5010
Australia 0.0692 0.0476 0.0476 0.4897 0.4321
India 0.0660 0.0473 0.0473 0.4012 0.3880
Switzerland 0.0493 0.0350 0.0350 0.3505 0.4272
Belgium and Luxembourg 0.0490 0.0345 0.0345 0.7702 0.4764
Argentina 0.0477 0.0332 0.0332 0.3684 0.3838
Sweden 0.0502 0.0326 0.0326 0.5333 0.4503
Turkey 0.0482 0.0320 0.0320 0.4401 0.3773
Austria 0.0422 0.0270 0.0270 0.5808 0.4882
Denmark 0.0344 0.0213 0.0213 0.5075 0.4188
Norway 0.0307 0.0188 0.0188 0.4706 0.4226
Greece 0.0301 0.0184 0.0184 0.4454 0.3640
South Africa 0.0292 0.0178 0.0178 0.4435 0.3577
Finland 0.0268 0.0161 0.0161 0.4696 0.4064
Portugal 0.0233 0.0139 0.0139 0.5321 0.3749
Israel 0.0200 0.0116 0.0116 0.5066 0.3940
Ireland 0.0144 0.0092 0.0092 0.6945 0.4565
New Zealand 0.0129 0.0070 0.0070 0.4172 0.3670
Hungary 0.0097 0.0056 0.0056 0.5874 0.3711
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Table 9: Change of Log Welfare Gains (%) by Country
(log(con1=con0))  100
country free technology diusion free merchandise trade free both
(b = 1) (k = 1) (b = 1; k = 1)
United States 4.8092 8.5717 13.3915
Japan 9.5632 14.8861 24.4734
Germany 12.7404 14.4825 27.2102
France 16.7876 17.1885 33.9654
United Kingdom 18.0953 17.3614 35.4376
Italy 18.5823 18.9124 37.4897
China 23.7994 22.1311 45.9274
Brazil 26.4951 25.6547 52.1672
Canada 25.2351 20.0558 45.2580
Spain 26.1960 22.9513 49.1375
Mexico 30.8006 24.1553 54.9340
Russia 30.8843 26.8981 57.7847
Netherland 32.1362 13.6487 45.6947
Australia 31.8010 26.9533 58.7529
India 32.6218 28.7790 61.4144
Switzerland 38.9692 31.3746 67.6831
Belgium and Luxembourg 35.9247 18.5349 54.3821
Argentina 37.0011 31.3528 68.3833
Sweden 35.8793 27.5480 63.4089
Turkey 36.9104 30.0825 66.9957
Austria 37.5664 26.7223 64.2530
Denmark 41.2518 30.1195 71.3511
Norway 42.7284 31.8196 74.5354
Greece 43.5285 32.6503 76.1713
South Africa 43.9858 32.9903 76.8435
Finland 44.7932 32.5380 77.3159
Portugal 47.0380 30.8380 77.8386
Israel 48.9556 32.4719 81.3939
Ireland 51.9132 23.7249 75.5522
New Zealand 55.4087 37.9240 93.3167
Hungary 59.3049 30.2992 113.5795
Table 10: Change of Log Welfare Gains (%) If Only Productivity Shock in Tradable Sector
(consumption equivalence)
(log(con1=con0))  100
From benchmark to: Average 31 countries Maximum among 31 countries
free trade and diusion 26.0884 54.4346
(k = 1; b = 1)
only free trade 25.2975 38.3504
(k = 1)
only free diusion 0.0369 0.9589
(b = 1)
47
Table 11: Real GDP Per Capita and its Change (%) by Country
country benchmark free diusion free trade free both
(log change) (log change) (log change)
United States 1.0000 1.0000 ( - ) 1.0000 ( - ) 1.0000 ( - )
Japan 0.9268 0.9719 ( 4.75 ) 0.9872 ( 6.31 ) 1.0354 ( 11.08 )
Germany 0.9166 0.9923 ( 7.93 ) 0.9725 ( 5.91 ) 1.0525 ( 13.82 )
France 0.7947 0.8958 ( 11.98 ) 0.8662 ( 8.62 ) 0.9762 ( 20.57 )
United Kingdom 0.6978 0.7970 ( 13.29 ) 0.7619 ( 8.79 ) 0.8699 ( 22.05 )
Italy 0.6704 0.7694 ( 13.77 ) 0.7435 ( 10.34 ) 0.8531 ( 24.10 )
China 0.0192 0.0233 ( 18.99 ) 0.0220 ( 13.56 ) 0.0266 ( 32.54 )
Brazil 0.1073 0.1333 ( 21.69 ) 0.1273 ( 17.08 ) 0.1581 ( 38.78 )
Canada 0.6830 0.8378 ( 20.43 ) 0.7661 ( 11.48 ) 0.9393 ( 31.87 )
Spain 0.4579 0.5671 ( 21.39 ) 0.5287 ( 14.38 ) 0.6547 ( 35.75 )
Mexico 0.1308 0.1697 ( 25.99 ) 0.1529 ( 15.58 ) 0.1982 ( 41.54 )
Russia 0.0764 0.0991 ( 26.08 ) 0.0917 ( 18.33 ) 0.1190 ( 44.39 )
Netherland 0.7248 0.9526 ( 27.33 ) 0.7625 ( 5.08 ) 1.0012 ( 32.30 )
Australia 0.5872 0.7691 ( 26.99 ) 0.7057 ( 18.38 ) 0.9242 ( 45.36 )
India 0.0103 0.0136 ( 27.81 ) 0.0126 ( 20.21 ) 0.0167 ( 48.02 )
Switzerland 0.9652 1.3583 ( 34.16 ) 1.2125 ( 22.80 ) 1.6612 ( 54.29 )
Belgium and Luxembourg 0.7439 1.0154 ( 31.12 ) 0.8218 ( 9.96 ) 1.1208 ( 40.99 )
Argentina 0.1899 0.2620 ( 32.19 ) 0.2384 ( 22.78 ) 0.3290 ( 54.99 )
Sweden 0.8326 1.1360 ( 31.07 ) 1.0066 ( 18.98 ) 1.3729 ( 50.02 )
Turkey 0.1079 0.1488 ( 32.10 ) 0.1338 ( 21.51 ) 0.1844 ( 53.60 )
Austria 0.7618 1.0570 ( 32.76 ) 0.9134 ( 18.15 ) 1.2668 ( 50.86 )
Denmark 0.8812 1.2686 ( 36.44 ) 1.0931 ( 21.55 ) 1.5732 ( 57.96 )
Norway 0.9138 1.3351 ( 37.92 ) 1.1529 ( 23.25 ) 1.6842 ( 61.14 )
Greece 0.3614 0.5322 ( 38.72 ) 0.4597 ( 24.08 ) 0.6770 ( 62.78 )
South Africa 0.0896 0.1325 ( 39.18 ) 0.1143 ( 24.42 ) 0.1689 ( 63.45 )
Finland 0.6624 0.9880 ( 39.98 ) 0.8417 ( 23.97 ) 1.2552 ( 63.92 )
Portugal 0.2904 0.4430 ( 42.23 ) 0.3628 ( 22.27 ) 0.5532 ( 64.45 )
Israel 0.4534 0.7050 ( 44.15 ) 0.5758 ( 23.90 ) 0.8949 ( 68.00 )
Ireland 0.5068 0.8118 ( 47.10 ) 0.5898 ( 15.15 ) 0.9437 ( 62.16 )
New Zealand 0.3775 0.6261 ( 50.60 ) 0.5062 ( 29.35 ) 0.8394 ( 79.93 )
Hungary 0.1047 0.1806 ( 54.50 ) 0.1301 ( 21.73 ) 0.2852 ( 100.19 )
Notes: (log(gdppnew=gdppbench))  100 in parentheses.
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Table 12: Merchandise Trade Share (Vi) by Country Under Dierent Scenarios
country benchmark free diusion free trade free both
United States 0.0870 0.0881 0.3683 0.3688
Japan 0.0199 0.0203 0.4340 0.4343
Germany 0.1930 0.1948 0.4555 0.4557
France 0.1949 0.1966 0.4692 0.4693
United Kingdom 0.2273 0.2291 0.4731 0.4732
Italy 0.1762 0.1777 0.4740 0.4741
China 0.1727 0.1742 0.4829 0.4830
Brazil 0.0757 0.0765 0.4861 0.4862
Canada 0.2842 0.2861 0.4851 0.4852
Spain 0.2016 0.2032 0.4860 0.4861
Mexico 0.2510 0.2527 0.4901 0.4901
Russia 0.1511 0.1524 0.4903 0.4904
Netherland 0.4478 0.4486 0.4915 0.4916
Australia 0.1686 0.1700 0.4909 0.4909
India 0.0966 0.0975 0.4913 0.4913
Switzerland 0.0739 0.2024 0.4935 0.4935
Belgium and Luxembourg 0.4237 0.4247 0.4936 0.4936
Argentina 0.0889 0.0889 0.4937 0.4937
Sweden 0.2397 0.2414 0.4934 0.4934
Turkey 0.1492 0.1505 0.4936 0.4937
Austria 0.3039 0.3056 0.4944 0.4945
Denmark 0.2485 0.2502 0.4955 0.4955
Norway 0.2182 0.2199 0.4960 0.4960
Greece 0.1921 0.1936 0.4960 0.4961
South Africa 0.1926 0.1941 0.4961 0.4962
Finland 0.2298 0.2314 0.4965 0.4965
Portugal 0.3124 0.3141 0.4969 0.4969
Israel 0.2998 0.3015 0.4974 0.4974
Ireland 0.4552 0.4559 0.4981 0.4981
New Zealand 0.2335 0.2352 0.4983 0.4983
Hungary 0.4273 0.4283 0.4987 0.4967
Table 13: Sensitivity tests for the share of diusive technology
D 0.7 0.9 0.99 0.9999999999
k 0.5518 0.5517 0.5419 0.5560
b 0.3196 0.3078 0.2882 0.1264
Table 14: Robustness Check for Change of Welfare Gains (%) if all technologies are diusive
(D = 1)
(consumption equivalence)
(log(con1=con0))  100
Average 31 countries Maximum among 31 countries
free trade and free diusion 61.17 160.56
(k = 1; b = 1)
only free trade in goods 20.41 27.42
(k = 1)
only free technology diusion 34.84 82.12
(b = 1)
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Table 15: Robustness Check for Change of Welfare Gains (%) Using Larger Diusion Share Data
by Royalty-calculated Method
(consumption equivalence)
(log(con1=con0))  100
Average 31 countries Maximum among 31 countries
free trade and free diusion 60.93 116.39
(k = 1; b = 1)
only free trade in goods 24.94 37.91
(k = 1)
only free technology diusion 35.33 60.87
(b = 1)
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